How to Remove a Saved Password from a Browser

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An important component of the attestation object is the attestation statement. Click the Refresh button. Question Answer What comes in the The following is included: Dominion KX II provides the ability to switch from one target server to another. Can be deleted to reset download actions.

What is the Security Tango?

Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials Level 1

Between June 29 and July 6, , Russian actors used the Cisco Smart Install protocol to scan for vulnerable network devices. Two Russian cyber actor-controlled hosts, In early July , the commands sent to targets changed slightly, copying the running configuration file instead of the startup configuration file. Additionally, the second command copies the file saved to flash memory instead of directly copying the configuration file.

According to information derived from FBI investigations, malicious cyber actors are increasingly using a style of brute force attack known as password spraying against organizations in the United States and abroad. On February , the Department of Justice in the Southern District of New York, indicted nine Iranian nationals, who were associated with the Mabna Institute, for computer intrusion offenses related to activity described in this report.

The techniques and activity described herein, while characteristic of Mabna actors, are not limited solely to use by this group. In a traditional brute-force attack, a malicious actor attempts to gain unauthorized access to a single account by guessing the password.

This can quickly result in a targeted account getting locked-out, as commonly used account-lockout policies allow three to five bad attempts during a set period of time. This technique allows the actor to remain undetected by avoiding rapid or frequent account lockouts.

Password spray campaigns typically target single sign-on SSO and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols. An actor may target this specific protocol because federated authentication can help mask malicious traffic.

Additionally, by targeting SSO applications, malicious actors hope to maximize access to intellectual property during a successful compromise. Email applications are also targeted. Traditional tactics, techniques, and procedures TTPs for conducting the password-spray attacks are as follows:. The vast majority of known password spray victims share some of the following characteristics [1] [2]:. A successful network intrusion can have severe impacts, particularly if the compromise becomes public and sensitive information is exposed.

CyWatch can be contacted by phone at or by e-mail at CyWatch ic. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people, and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. This alert provides information on Russian government actions targeting U.

Government entities as well as organizations in the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors. It also contains indicators of compromise IOCs and technical details on the tactics, techniques, and procedures TTPs used by Russian government cyber actors on compromised victim networks. DHS and FBI produced this alert to educate network defenders to enhance their ability to identify and reduce exposure to malicious activity.

After obtaining access, the Russian government cyber actors conducted network reconnaissance, moved laterally, and collected information pertaining to Industrial Control Systems ICS. Contact DHS or law enforcement immediately to report an intrusion and to request incident response resources or technical assistance. Analysis by DHS and FBI, resulted in the identification of distinct indicators and behaviors related to this activity.

Of note, the report Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group, released by Symantec on September 6, , provides additional information about this ongoing campaign. This campaign comprises two distinct categories of victims: Phases of the model include reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, and actions on the objective.

The threat actors appear to have deliberately chosen the organizations they targeted, rather than pursuing them as targets of opportunity. Staging targets held preexisting relationships with many of the intended targets. DHS analysis identified the threat actors accessing publicly available information hosted by organization-monitored networks during the reconnaissance phase.

Based on forensic analysis, DHS assesses the threat actors sought information on network and organizational design and control system capabilities within organizations. These tactics are commonly used to collect the information needed for targeted spear-phishing attempts.

In some cases, information posted to company websites, especially information that may appear to be innocuous, may contain operationally sensitive information.

As an example, the threat actors downloaded a small photo from a publicly accessible human resources page. The image, when expanded, was a high-resolution photo that displayed control systems equipment models and status information in the background.

Additionally, the threat actors attempted to remotely access infrastructure such as corporate web-based email and virtual private network VPN connections. Throughout the spear-phishing campaign, the threat actors used email attachments to leverage legitimate Microsoft Office functions for retrieving a document from a remote server using the Server Message Block SMB protocol. An example of this request is: After obtaining a credential hash, the threat actors can use password-cracking techniques to obtain the plaintext password.

With valid credentials, the threat actors are able to masquerade as authorized users in environments that use single-factor authentication. Threat actors compromised the infrastructure of trusted organizations to reach intended targets. Although these watering holes may host legitimate content developed by reputable organizations, the threat actors altered websites to contain and reference malicious content.

The threat actors used legitimate credentials to access and directly modify the website content. This request accomplishes a similar technique observed in the spear-phishing documents for credential harvesting.

The file was modified to contain the contents below:. When compromising staging target networks, the threat actors used spear-phishing emails that differed from previously reported TTPs.

Note the inclusion of two single back ticks at the beginning of the attachment name. The PDF was not malicious and did not contain any active code.

The document contained a shortened URL that, when clicked, led users to a website that prompted the user for email address and password. In previous reporting, DHS and FBI noted that all of these spear-phishing emails referred to control systems or process control systems.

The threat actors continued using these themes specifically against intended target organizations. Email messages included references to common industrial control equipment and protocols. The threat actors used distinct and unusual TTPs in the phishing campaign directed at staging targets. Emails contained successive redirects to http: When exploiting the intended targets, the threat actors used malicious. This connection is made to a command and control C2 server—either a server owned by the threat actors or that of a victim.

When a user attempted to authenticate to the domain, the C2 server was provided with the hash of the password. Local users received a graphical user interface GUI prompt to enter a username and password, and the C2 received this information over TCP ports or The threat actors used scripts to create local administrator accounts disguised as legitimate backup accounts. The script then attempted to add the newly created account to the administrators group to gain elevated privileges.

DHS observed the threat actors using this and similar scripts to create multiple accounts within staging target networks. Each account created by the threat actors served a specific purpose in their operation. These purposes ranged from the creation of additional accounts to cleanup of activity. Account 1 was named to mimic backup services of the staging target.

This account was created by the malicious script described earlier. The threat actor used this account to conduct open-source reconnaissance and remotely access intended targets. Account 1 was used to create Account 2 to impersonate an email administration account.

The only observed action was to create Account 3. The naming conventions of the created Microsoft Exchange account followed that of the staging target e.

In the latter stage of the compromise, the threat actor used Account 1 to create Account 4, a local administrator account.

Account 4 was then used to delete logs and cover tracks. In addition, the threat actors created a scheduled task named reset , which was designed to automatically log out of their newly created account every eight hours.

After achieving access to staging targets, the threat actors installed tools to carry out operations against intended victims. On one occasion, threat actors installed the free version of FortiClient, which they presumably used as a VPN client to connect to intended target networks. Consistent with the perceived goal of credential harvesting, the threat actors dropped and executed open source and free tools such as Hydra, SecretsDump, and CrackMapExec.

The naming convention and download locations suggest that these files were downloaded directly from publically available locations such as GitHub. Forensic analysis indicates that many of these tools were executed during the timeframe in which the actor was accessing the system. Of note, the threat actors installed Python 2. The initial versions of the file names contained.

In one example, after gaining remote access to the network of an intended victim, the threat actor carried out the following actions:. Default Windows functionality enables icons to be loaded from a local or remote Windows repository. The threat actors exploited this built-in Windows functionality by setting the icon path to a remote server controller by the actors.

When the user browses to the directory, Windows attempts to load the icon and initiate an SMB authentication session. These names appeared to be contextual, and the threat actor may use a variety of other file names while using this tactic. Two of the remote servers observed in the icon path of these LNK files were Below is the parsed content of one of the LNK files:.

The threat actor would modify key systems to store plaintext credentials in memory. In one instance, the threat actor executed the following command. The threat actors used the infrastructure of staging targets to connect to several intended targets.

Upon gaining access to intended victims, the threat actors conducted reconnaissance operations within the network. The observed outputs text documents from these scripts were:. Some common directory names were. In multiple instances, the threat actors accessed workstations and servers on a corporate network that contained data output from control systems within energy generation facilities. The threat actors targeted and copied profile and configuration information for accessing ICS systems on the network.

In multiple instances, the threat actors created new accounts on the staging targets to perform cleanup operations. The accounts created were used to clear the following Windows event logs: The threat actors also removed applications they installed while they were in the network along with any logs produced. For example, the Fortinet client installed at one commercial facility was deleted along with the logs that were produced from its use. Finally, data generated by other accounts used on the systems accessed were deleted.

Threat actors cleaned up intended target networks through deleting created screenshots and specific registry keys. Through forensic analysis, DHS determined that the threat actors deleted the registry key associated with terminal server client that tracks connections made to remote systems.

IOCs related to this campaign are provided within the accompanying. DHS and FBI recommend that network administrators review the IP addresses, domain names, file hashes, network signatures, and YARA rules provided, and add the IPs to their watchlists to determine whether malicious activity has been observed within their organization.

System owners are also advised to run the YARA tool on any system suspected to have been targeted by these threat actors. This section contains network signatures and host-based rules that can be used to detect malicious activity associated with threat actor TTPs.

Although these network signatures and host-based rules were created using a comprehensive vetting process, the possibility of false positives always remains. This is a consolidated rule set for malware associated with this activity. DHS and FBI encourage network users and administrators to use the following detection and prevention guidelines to help defend against this activity.

DHS and FBI recommend that network administrators review the IP addresses, domain names, file hashes, and YARA and Snort signatures provided and add the IPs to their watch list to determine whether malicious activity is occurring within their organization. Reviewing network perimeter netflow will help determine whether a network has experienced suspicious activity.

DHS encourages recipients who identify the use of tools or techniques discussed in this document to report information to DHS or law enforcement immediately. These vulnerabilities can be exploited to steal sensitive data present in a computer systems' memory. This can be found in the "Passwords and forms" section. Find the password you want to delete.

You can use the search bar at the top of the window to find a specific password. Hover over the entry and click the "X" button that appears to remove the password. If you want to clear all of your store passwords, the quickest way to do so is to return to the Settings menu and click Clear browsing data Check the "Passwords" box, and select "the beginning of time" from the top of the window. Click Clear browsing data to delete all the stored passwords.

Open "Internet Options" window. You can access this from the Tools menu or by clicking the Gear icon in the upper-right corner. If you can't see your menubar, press the Alt key. Select "Internet Options" from the menu. Find the "Browsing history" section. This is in the General tab. Check the "Passwords" and "Cookies" options. This will set all of your stored passwords and other login information to be deleted. Click Delete to delete your login information and passwords.

Open the password manager. Click Saved P asswords Select a password to delete. Remove a single password. Click the password you want to delete, then click Remove at the bottom of the window. Remove all the passwords. To remove all the stored passwords, click Remove A ll. You will be asked to confirm that you want to proceed. Tap the Menu button.

This is located in the upper-right corner of the screen. You can also remove all saved passwords by clicking the Remove All button. If you wish, deselect the option to Remember logins for sites. This will prevent passwords from being saved in the future.

In older versions of Firefox, this option is in the Privacy tab instead of Security. More information on managing website passwords in Chrome can be found in the Google Help pages. How to Remove a Saved Password from a Browser.

Mozilla Firefox Windows Click the menu button and choose Preferences.

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